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I.  Introduction 
Since the mid-1990s, many countries have experienced prolonged periods of rapid 
price appreciation in equity, housing, and other asset markets which have drawn the attention 
of economists and policymakers to the role of asset prices in the propagation of business 
cycles.  Economists disagree about the appropriate response of monetary policy to asset price 
booms.  Some argue that financial markets are inherently volatile and that market prices 
often stray from fundamentals, suggesting that policymakers could improve welfare by 
deflating asset price booms, especially if sudden asset price declines are likely to depress 
economic activity.  Other economists claim that financial markets process information 
efficiently, or that policymakers usually cannot determine when assets are mispriced and, 
hence, that they cannot enhance aggregate welfare by reacting to asset price movements. 
Financial historians have long been fascinated by the behavior of asset markets, 
especially asset price bubbles, crashes and other dramatic phenomena.  Research on these 
episodes has yielded important information about the development of financial markets, and 
the effects of financial regulation and macroeconomic policy on the stability of markets.
1  
We believe that history can also inform the debate about the appropriate response, if any, of 
monetary policy to asset price booms.  Accordingly, this paper investigates the 
macroeconomic and policy environments in which stock market booms occurred among ten 
developed countries during the 20
th Century.  Our multi-country historical approach enables  
us to explore the association between stock market booms and key macroeconomic and 
monetary policy variables across a variety of policy regimes and regulatory environments.  
                                                 
1   Among Larry Neal’s important contributions in this area are his work on the South Sea Bubble, the 
development of European capital markets from the 16
th to 19
th Centuries (Neal, 1990), and the British financial 
crisis of 1825 (Neal, 1998). 2 
We construct monthly, real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) stock price indexes for ten 
countries for which the necessary data are readily available over most of the 20
th Century.  
We then identify extended periods of unusually rapid appreciation in the indexes for each 
country, which we define as booms.  Finally, we use a simple event methodology to study the 
behavior of key macroeconomic and monetary policy variables during stock market booms.   
We find that booms generally occurred during periods of above-average economic 
growth and below-average inflation, and that booms typically ended when monetary policy 
tightened in response to rising inflation.  Most booms were procyclical – arising during 
business cycle recoveries and expansions, and ending when rising inflation and tighter 
monetary policy were followed by declining economic activity.  We also find, however, that 
some 20
th Century booms were not associated with rapid economic growth or low inflation, 
and that stock markets were often affected by changes in regulation and other events, such as 
oil price shocks and political upheaval. 
Although we are able to examine stock markets and macroeconomic conditions in a 
variety of settings, the limited variety and frequency of historical data for many countries 
necessarily means that our study is more impressionistic than formal.  For example, whereas 
the standard efficient markets present value model posits that stock prices reflect discounted 
expected future dividends, we lack data to estimate confidently expected dividend growth or 
changes in the discount factor.  Hence, we do not address directly the question whether 
specific stock market booms degenerated into bubbles.  Policymakers are unlikely ever to 
have data that enable them to identify bubbles definitively as they arise, however, and a 
review of historical experiences can provide insights that help policymakers respond to 
events in real time. 3 
Section II briefly summarizes prior findings and presents information about the stock 
market booms in our data.  Sections III and IV examine the macroeconomic conditions under 
which 20
th Century stock market booms occurred among the ten countries.  Section V 
summarizes our observations and conclusions. 
II.  Stock Market Booms and Crashes 
Most studies of the relationship between asset booms and macroeconomic conditions 
focus on the consequences of booms and, especially, of market crashes for macroeconomic 
activity.  Several draw lessons for policy from crash experiences.  Recent examples include 
Bordo (2003), Mishkin and White (2003), and Helbling and Terrones (2004).   
Bordo (2003) finds that many, but by no means all U.S. and British stock market 
crashes of the 19
th and 20
th Centuries were followed by recessions.  A serious decline in 
economic activity was more likely, he concludes, if a crash was accompanied or followed by 
a banking panic.  Mishkin and White (2003) come to a similar conclusion in their review of 
U.S. stock market crashes in the 20
th Century.  They find that a severe economic downturn 
was more likely to follow a crash if the crash was accompanied by a widening of interest rate 
credit spreads.  The key lesson for policy, Mishkin and White (2003) argue, is that 
policymakers should focus on the financial instability that can arise in the wake of crashes, 
rather than on crashes per se.   
Helbling and Terrones (2004) examine median output growth across major stock 
market booms and busts of 1970-2001 and find that busts often preceded sharp slowdowns in 
economic activity.  Echoing an observation of Bordo’s (2003) about U.S. and British crashes 4 
of the 19
th and early 20
th Centuries, Helbling and Terrones (2004) find that busts typically 
coincided with or followed a tightening of monetary conditions.
2  
Whereas numerous studies explore the effects of stock market crashes, relatively few 
examine the conditions under which stock market booms arise or persist.  In a prior paper 
(Bordo and Wheelock, 2004), we examined episodes of unusually rapid growth of U.S. 
nominal stock prices during the 19
th and 20
th Centuries.  We found that many such episodes 
occurred when real output and productivity growth (both labor productivity and total factor 
productivity) were unusually rapid, suggesting that stock prices were at least partly justified 
by macroeconomic conditions.  By contrast, we found no consistent relationship between the 
growth of nominal stock prices and inflation, but noted that inflation was usually low and 
stable during periods of rapid growth in real stock prices.  Here we explore in more depth the 
macroeconomic conditions under which stock market booms have occurred in the United 
States and nine other developed countries.  In so doing, we hope to obtain insights about the 
macroeconomic conditions and policies that seem to foster booms, and whether experiences 
differ across countries. 
Defining Booms 
There is, of course, no precise empirical definition of an asset boom, and researchers 
have imposed a number of filters to identify specific episodes that they then define as booms.  
We adapt the methodology of Pagan and Sossounov (2003) to identify prolonged periods of 
rapidly rising real stock prices in ten countries for which monthly data on a nominal stock 
price index and a consumer price index are available from the early 1920s onward:  
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
                                                 
2   Helbling and Terrones (2004) also examine the effects of housing market booms and busts, and find that 
housing cycles have been more closely related to monetary policy, and that housing busts are associated with 
larger declines in economic activity than stock market busts. 5 
Kingdom, and the United States.
3  We identify the maximum and minimum observations of 
the real stock price within rolling, 25-month windows.  We require that market peaks and 
troughs alternate, and so eliminate all but the highest maximum that occurred before a 
subsequent trough, and all but the lowest minimum that occurred before a subsequent peak.  
We classify as booms all periods of at least three years from trough to peak with an average 
annual rate of increase in the real stock price index of at least 10 percent.  We also classify as 
booms a few episodes of exceptional real stock price appreciation that were shorter than three 
years.
4
Table 1 lists the episodes we define as booms for each country in our sample.  For 
each boom, we include information about the average annual percentage increase in the 
market index from the market trough to its peak.  Because several booms began as recoveries 
from market declines, we also note when the real stock price surpassed its prior 25-month 
peak, and report the average annual percentage increase in the index after that date.   
For comparison, Table 1 also reports information about long-run average annual rates 
of change in the real stock price index for each country.  For example, the U.S. real stock 
price index increased at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent during 1915-40, and at an 
average annual rate of 4.4 percent during 1947-2004.  Thus, the periods we define as booms 
were characterized by rates of appreciation that were substantially higher than long-run 
averages.  Finally, Table 1 also includes information about the extent to which the real stock 
price index declined during the 12 months following a market peak, and from the market 
                                                 
3   We selected our sample countries based on the availability of historical data on a stock market index and key 
macroeconomic series, which obviously gives rise to possible sample selection bias.  We are unsure of the 
extent to which our findings would differ if our sample included recently developed or emerging market 
economies.  The appendix describes our data and sources. 
4   Helbling and Terrones (2004) use a similar procedure to identify booms and busts.  Specifically, they identify 
turning points in the log-level of real equity prices over five quarter windows, and define booms (busts) as the 
largest one-fourth of all price increases (declines).   6 
peak to the next market trough.  Almost all booms were followed by real declines of at least 
10 percent within 12 months.  Not all booms ended with a spectacular crash, however, and 
the lengths and sizes of market declines after booms varied widely.   
Comparison of stock price index growth rates is problematic because of differences in 
index composition across countries and over time.  For the interwar period, cross-country 
comparisons are further complicated by differences in when monthly data on a nominal stock 
price index and inflation are first available, and in the nature and the availability of stock 
price data for the late 1930s associated with when countries became involved in World War 
II.  For the post-World War II period, we report average growth rates for 1947-2004 for all 
countries in the sample except Germany, Italy, and Japan, for which we report growth rates 
over 1950-2004.  The real stock price indexes for these three countries exhibit rapid growth 
during the 1950s compared to average growth rates for subsequent decades.  Among the 
other sample countries, we note considerable variation in average real stock price growth 
rates, ranging from 2.4 percent for Australia to 5.7 percent for Sweden.  Again, however, 
such long-run cross-country comparisons are problematic because the performance of stock 
markets varied considerably over time within countries, as well as because of differences in 
the coverage of industries and firms in the stock market indexes of individual countries.   
We find considerable coincidence in the occurrence of stock market booms across 
sample countries, as illustrated in Figure 1.  This figure indicates the number of countries in 
our sample with an ongoing stock market boom in each month from January 1924 to 
December 2000 (we omit the 1940s when the stock markets of several countries were closed 
for extended periods because of World War II).  Several countries experienced a substantial 
increase in real stock prices during the 1920s and a market peak in 1929, as well as booms in 7 
the mid-1930s as their economies climbed out of the Great Depression.  Most countries in 
our sample also had booms in the late 1950s, in the mid-1980s and again in the 1990s.  By 
contrast, there were almost no stock market booms among our sample countries from the 
mid-1960s to the early 1980s.  
Additional information on the co-movement of stock markets among our sample 
countries is illustrated in Figure 2.  We computed rolling, five-year correlations in the 
monthly percentage changes in the real stock price indexes of each pair of countries in our 
sample.  Figure 2 plots the monthly averages of these correlations between 1920 and 1999.  
The figure illustrates that the average correlation in the monthly capital returns of the various 
stock markets varied widely over time.  Periods of relatively high correlation included the 
late 1920s, late 1960s to early 1970s, the mid-1980s, and late 1990s.  Except for the late 
1960s to early 1970s, each period of high correlation was marked by booms in several 
countries.   
The pattern of average correlations of cross-country returns among our ten sample 
countries is largely consistent with the findings of studies of international financial 
integration.  Goetzmann et al. (2001), for example, find that equity market returns were 
relatively highly correlated during the late 19
th Century, the interwar period, and in the late 
20
th Century.  And, from evidence on nominal and real interest rate differentials, Obstfeld 
and Taylor (1998) conclude that international financial markets were highly integrated before 
World War I.  A brief period of high integration occurred again in the late 1920s (as our 
equity market data also suggest), but fell apart during the Great Depression.  Markets 
gradually re-integrated in the late 1950s and 1960s before entering a period of disintegration 
associated with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates in the 8 
early 1970s.  International financial markets became highly integrated once again during the 
1980s and 1990s, again consistent with the high correlation among stock returns we find in 
this period. 
III.  The Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy Environment of 20
th Century Booms 
The basic efficient markets present value model posits that stock prices reflect 
discounted expected future dividends and, hence, that price changes reflect changes in 
expected dividends and/or the discount rate (proxied by the real interest rate).  We do not 
have direct measures of expected dividend growth, or even data that would enable us to 
estimate confidently expected dividend growth.  For the United States, one might look to 
changes in trend productivity growth to gauge expected growth of output, profits and 
dividends in the future, but except for recent years, even annual estimates of productivity are 
not available for other countries.  We do, however, have estimates of current output growth 
(GDP) for several countries and, as a first step, we investigate whether stock price booms 
historically have occurred during periods of rapid output growth.  Of course, current output 
growth rates are not necessarily good proxies for expected future growth unless investors 
simply extrapolate current output growth rates into the future. 
Researchers have identified several channels by which monetary policy might affect 
stock prices.  Monetary policy is often thought to operate through the short-term real interest 
rate and, thus, policy might affect the real interest rate that investors use to discount future 
profits, at least in the short run.  Indeed, we find that booms typically have arisen when 
interest rates are low and/or falling, and end following increases in policy rates.   
Monetary policy might also affect stock prices through inflation and/or inflation 
uncertainty.  There have been several attempts to explain a negative correlation between the 9 
growth of stock prices and inflation observed in U.S. data.  Inflation uncertainty could 
increase risk premiums.  By the same token, a policy commitment to a stable price level that 
investors view as credible might hasten a boom by reducing risk premiums or raising 
forecasts of future real growth.  This suggests that stock prices could reflect the monetary 
policy regime.  We investigate the association between booms, monetary policy actions, and 
inflation. 
Finally, domestic or foreign shocks of various sorts, including political events, wars, 
and economic policies of other countries can affect stock prices.  At times, countries have 
used capital controls and other policies to wall off their domestic markets from external 
forces, as well as to channel capital to specific uses.  Various domestic financial regulations, 
such as margin requirements and ownership restrictions, may also affect the observed 
associations between stock prices and macroeconomic conditions and monetary policy.  A 
thorough review of the myriad regulations imposed on equity markets over time across the 
ten countries in our sample is beyond the scope of this paper.  We note, however, several 
instances in which stock market booms appear to have been associated with changes in 
regulation or other policies. 
We begin our study of the macroeconomic environments of stock market booms by 
examining annual data on real GDP growth and inflation across all boom episodes listed in 
Table 1.  In Section IV, we focus separately on stock market booms of the interwar, early 
post-World War II, and post-1970 periods.     
For all stock market booms listed in Table 1, we computed real GDP growth relative 
to its long-run average for each market peak year and the eight years before and after each 10 
peak.
5  Real GDP growth exceeded its long-run average during a majority of stock market 
booms.  Figure 3 plots the median real GDP growth rate (relative to its long-run average) in 
market peak years (year “0”) and in the eight years before and after market peaks.
6  The chart 
illustrates that across all booms, median real GDP growth increased sharply relative to its 
long-run average during the two years prior to a stock market peak, and exceeded its long-run 
average by 1.5 percentage points in both the market peak and prior years.  Median growth 
also fell sharply during the two years following a peak.  Thus, the typical boom arose when 
output growth was above average and rising, and ended when output growth stopped 
increasing.  Median output growth fell sharply in the year following a market peak and many 
booms were followed by a period of economic contraction. 
Figure 3 also shows the mean absolute deviation of observations around the median, 
illustrating the dispersion in GDP growth rates across boom episodes.  Observations on 
output growth are less dispersed during booms, which usually lasted for three to five years 
before a market peak, than before.  Observations are least dispersed from about two years 
before a market peak year (year “−2”) to about two years after a peak year (year “2”).   
Figure 4 plots median inflation (relative to its long-run average) during booms and 
their aftermath.
7  Booms tended to arise when inflation was below its long-run average and 
also falling.  The median inflation rate was approximately 1 percentage point below its long-
run average between four and seven years before a market peak, and 2 percentage points 
below its long-run average during the two years prior to a market peak.  Inflation tended to 
                                                 
5  For the interwar period, we use the average over 1871-1939 as the “long-run” average GDP growth rate.  For 
the post-World War II period, we use the average over 1960-2001.   
6  For all figures in the paper that show annual data, we define year “0” as the year the stock market reached a 
peak unless the peak occurred in the first half of a year, in which case we define year “0” as the year prior to the 
year of the peak.   
7   For the interwar period, we use the annual average rate of consumer price inflation over the years for which 
we have data for individual countries, through 1939, as the long-run average.  For the post-World War II period, 
we use the average rate for 1947-2004 as the long-run average. 11 
return slowly to its long-run average after a market peak.  Figure 4 also illustrates the 
dispersion of observations around the median, as shown by the mean absolute deviation of 
observations around the median.  As with GDP growth, the dispersion of inflation rates 
around their long-run averages declines over time toward the market peak year.
8   
IV.  The Macroeconomic Environments of  20
th Century Booms:  Subperiods 
Although a majority of 20
th Century stock market booms in our sample countries 
occurred during periods of above average real output growth and below average inflation, 
many booms occurred when output growth was near normal, or even below normal, and/or 
when inflation exceeded its long-run average.  Moreover, booms occurred under a variety of 
macroeconomic and regulatory policy regimes.  We next examine the association of 
macroeconomic and monetary policy conditions and stock market booms during the interwar, 
early post-World War II, and recent decades separately.  In so doing, we seek to learn more 
about the associations between macroeconomic conditions, monetary policy, and booms 
under different environments.   
The Interwar Period 
World War I was, of course, a major shock to the world’s principal economies.  
Differences in the pace of post-war recovery in individual countries reflected both the extent 
to which countries were involved in the war and in the economic policies their governments 
pursued after the war.  The United States, for example, experienced high inflation in 1918-19 
but deflation and a sharp, but short-lived recession in 1920-21.  The abrupt change in 
macroeconomic conditions reflected a shift from a highly expansionary monetary policy 
                                                 
8   Bordo and Wheelock (2006) compare GDP growth and inflation during U.S. booms with the medians across 
the remaining nine sample countries.  They find that the behavior of output and inflation were similar across 
U.S. and non-U.S. booms, but that, if anything, the association of booms with above-average output growth and 
below-average inflation was stronger across U.S. booms than across the non-U.S. median. 12 
geared toward financing the government’s debt at low interest rates to a tight policy aimed at 
quashing inflation and protecting the Federal Reserve’s gold reserves.
9  The Fed reversed 
course again in 1922 and the economy recovered quickly.  The U.S. economy enjoyed strong 
average growth and low, stable inflation throughout the remainder of the decade. 
The U.S. stock market ran a parallel course, with significant losses during the 
recession of 1921 followed by a strong recovery.  After a brief relapse in 1923, the market 
turned upward and posted several years of rapid real price appreciation until the market peak 
in September 1929.  Financial historians and other observers have long debated whether the 
U.S. market was over-valued at its peak.  Such notable economists as Fisher (1930) and, 
more recently, McGratton and Prescott (2004) argue that economic fundamentals could 
justify stock prices even at the market’s 1929 peak.  Similar to the “new economy” stories 
that appeared to explain the stock market boom of the 1990s, advances in technology and  
management practices were often cited in the 1920s as reasons why U.S. corporations could 
expect high earnings growth that justified the large increase in stock prices (White, 2006).  
The 1920s saw rapid diffusion of electric power, the internal combustion engine, and other 
“great inventions” of the late 19
th and early 20
th Centuries in American factories and homes 
(David, 1990; Gordon, 2000).  U.S. firms, especially in the manufacturing sector, 
experienced high average growth of labor and total factor productivity over the decade, 
though annual estimates suggest that productivity growth had slowed by the time the stock 
market boom was in full swing.
10
                                                 
9   See Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer (2003). 
10  Productivity change is most appropriately measured between business cycle peaks or other similar points in 
the business cycle.  However, private domestic labor productivity (output/hours) and total factor productivity 
rose at average annual rates of  3.0 and 2.62 percent during 1920-24, and at average rates of  1.74 and 1.32 
percent during 1925-29.  In the manufacturing sector, labor productivity rose at an average annual rate of 7.0 
percent during 1920-24 and 3.90 percent during 1925-29 (Private domestic productivity: Kendrick, 1961, Table 
A-XXII; manufacturing sector: Kendrick, 1961, Table D-II).   13 
Despite a highly favorable macroeconomic environment, many economists conclude 
that by 1929 U.S. stock prices far exceeded levels that could be justified by economic 
fundamentals.  DeLong and Schleifer (1991), for example, compare the prices and net asset 
values of closed-end mutual funds and conclude that stocks were some 30 percent over-
valued in 1929.  Rappoport and White (1993) reach a similar conclusion from examining the 
premium on brokers loans.  Other authors, such as Galbraith (1955), emphasize the rapid 
growth of investment trusts and commercial bank securities affiliates in the 1920s, and their 
role in enticing unsophisticated investors to the market.   
The Federal Reserve did not officially address the question whether the stock market 
was over-valued, but Fed officials were concerned about the growth of loans used to 
purchase stocks, and the possibility that Federal Reserve credit was being used to support 
that growth.  The Federal Reserve tightened abruptly in 1928, and pursued a tight policy 
through the market crash in October 1929 in an effort to choke off the flow of credit to the 
market.  This policy was reflected in both a sharp increase in interest rates and a slowing of 
money stock growth, which preceded the business cycle peak and may have hastened the 
economic contraction of 1929-33.
11
Besides the United States, five of the other nine countries in our sample experienced a 
stock market boom in the 1920s as their economies recovered from wartime disruption and as 
international capital markets were reintegrated under the gold exchange standard.  Several 
countries experienced a brief period of rapidly rising real stock prices during the recovery of 
1922-24, and a more sustained appreciation when their currencies were made convertible into 
gold or other hard currencies.   
                                                 
11   See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Meltzer (2003), and Wheelock (1991) for discussion and evidence on 
the Fed’s reaction to stock market speculation.  Based on a review several measures of monetary conditions, 
Hamilton (1987) concludes that monetary policy tightened considerably during 1928-29. 14 
The experiences of France and the United Kingdom, for example, illustrate a close 
association between macroeconomic conditions and policies, and stock market performance.  
France had a market boom associated with a business cycle recovery in 1920-24, though in 
real terms the stock market moved little beyond its previous cycle peak.  Stock prices then 
declined rapidly as monetization of government deficits produced inflation and capital flight.  
The market decline continued until November 1926, when the government budget was 
brought under control and investors became convinced that inflation would not reignite.
12   
Restored fiscal discipline ended capital flight and brought investors back to the Paris 
stock market.  The exchange rate policies pursued subsequently by the Bank of France 
further encouraged capital inflows.  The Bank pegged the value of the franc against other 
currencies in December 1926, and restored full convertibility of the franc into gold in June 
1928.  The exchange rate was, however, pegged well below its pre-war level against the U.S. 
dollar and British pound, the latter of which had been restored to its pre-war parity in May 
1925.  Under the exchange rate pegs maintained by the Bank of France and the Bank of 
England, France tended to attract capital and the United Kingdom tended to lose capital.  The 
Paris stock market boomed in this environment, with the real stock price index rising at a 40 
percent average annual rate between December 1926 and February 1929.  The London stock 
market rose at a considerably more modest pace.  Between May 1925, when convertibility of 
the pound was restored, and August 1929, when the London market reached its peak in real 
terms, the real stock price index rose at an average annual rate of just 7.4 percent.  Although 
above average, this rate of appreciation was well below the rates that the Paris and New York 
markets experienced over comparable periods. 
                                                 
12  On the French economic crisis, see Eichengreen (1992, pp. 172-83). 15 
The U.K. economy also grew at a much slower pace than did either the U.S. or 
French economies.  The Bank of England maintained a tight monetary policy throughout the 
1920s aimed first at restoring and then maintaining convertibility of the pound into gold at 
the pre-war parity.  Persistent doubts about the viability of the peg discouraged capital 
inflows, however, and kept a brake on economic activity and the stock market.  Thus, as in 
both the United States and France, the performance of the U.K. stock market during the 
1920s reflected underlying economic performance and macroeconomic policies. 
The United States and many other countries experienced a business cycle peak mid-
1929, and the major stock markets crashed within a few months of one another.  Several 
months of tight monetary policy, marked by high interest rates and slow money stock growth, 
preceded the U.S. business cycle peak.  The linkages of the international gold standard 
caused monetary conditions to tighten throughout the world, precipitating the Great 
Depression (Eichengreen, 1992).  The Depression was hard on stock markets.  For example, 
between its peak in September 1929 and low in June 1932, the Standard and Poor’s index of 
U.S. stocks declined 80 percent in real terms.  
Economic recovery brought renewed vigor to financial markets in the mid-1930s, 
when stock market booms occurred in eight of our ten sample countries.  As in the 1920s, the 
timing and extent of these booms were tied to economic recovery and the macroeconomic 
policies pursued in individual countries.  Currency devaluation and/or the imposition of 
restrictions on gold convertibility was a precursor to economic recovery in many countries 
(Eichengreen, 1992).  Britain abandoned the gold standard in September 1931, and several 
other countries quickly followed.  Stock prices began to rise in the United Kingdom and 
other countries in mid-1932.  Although stock prices posted gains in some countries that 16 
remained on gold, most countries did not have a sustained boom until they had abandoned 
the gold standard or at least devalued.  The United States, for example, experienced a 
financial crisis and market crash in early 1933, followed by a brief recovery after the 
Roosevelt Administration suspended gold convertibility and restored confidence in the U.S. 
banking system.  A sustained boom did not begin until the second quarter of 1935, however, 
when output growth stabilized and the economy began to grow consistently.
13
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the association between real economic growth, inflation, and 
stock market booms during the interwar period.  Figure 5 shows median real GDP growth 
relative to long-run averages during interwar boom episodes, and the mean absolute 
deviation around the median in each year.  Figure 6 shows similar data for inflation.  The 
patterns are like those shown for all 20
th Century boom episodes in Figures 3 and 4:  Booms 
tended to occur during periods of above average output growth and below average inflation.  
During interwar booms, median GDP growth exceeded its long-run average by about 3 
percentage points in market peak years, then fell sharply over the two years following market 
peaks.  Median inflation was below its long-run average until the year before a market peak, 
but rose sharply in the months preceding a market peak. 
Both U.S. stock market booms of the interwar period ended within months of a shift 
in monetary policy.  The boom of 1923-29 ended in September 1929, some 20 months after 
the Federal Reserve began to tighten to stem the flow of credit to the booming stock market.  
                                                 
13  Eichengreen (1992, pp. 344) notes that U.S. industrial production and other measures of economic activity 
fluctuated widely in 1933-34, and argues that the investor optimism created by the Roosevelt Administration’s 
response to the financial crises in early 1933 “fell back substantially when it became apparent that America’s 
departure from the gold standard had not inaugurated a new era of rapid monetary expansion.”  Among other 
sample countries, France, Italy, and the Netherlands remained on the gold standard until 1936, though Italy 
imposed stringent exchange controls in 1934.  The Netherlands experienced a slow real appreciation of stock 
prices from a low point in June 1932, but a significant rise only when it abandoned gold in September 1936.  
France experienced a market crash in mid-1936, and recovery upon abandoning gold, but no sustained stock 
market boom. 17 
Although consumer price inflation was minimal, Fed officials viewed speculation in stocks 
or other assets as a form of inflation that called for monetary restraint.
14     
The U.S. boom of 1935-37 also ended when monetary policy was tightened.  After 
largely staying on the sidelines as gold and currency inflows caused rapid growth of the 
money stock in 1933-36, the Fed tightened abruptly with a series of increases in commercial 
bank reserve requirements in August 1936, January 1937, and May 1937.  Although the 
consumer price level had risen only modestly since 1933, the Fed hiked reserve requirements 
because officials viewed the large volume of reserves that banks held in excess of legal 
requirements as posing an inflationary threat.  The stock market peak occurred in February, 
immediately after the second reserve requirement increase took effect on January 31, 1937.   
Early Post-World War II Era 
Stock market booms of the interwar period were closely associated with economic 
growth, inflation, and both domestic and international monetary policies.  New regulations 
on securities markets and capital flows were introduced during the Great Depression, and 
intensified during World War II.  We next examine stock market booms of the first two 
decades after the war, when controls on the allocation of economic resources were slowly 
eased and the international monetary system was reestablished, but many markets remained 
tightly regulated and international capital flows were restricted. 
International capital mobility hit a low point during and immediately after World War 
II as a result of exchange controls imposed during the Great Depression and strengthened 
during the war (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998, pp. 381-91).  Capital mobility gradually 
improved during the 1950s as the European Payments Union and other mechanisms were 
established to clear international payments and promote trade and economic recovery.  Over 
                                                 
14  See Chandler (1971) or Meltzer (2003) for discussion of the policy views of Fed officials at this time. 18 
time, countries eased restrictions on foreign exchange transactions and capital movements, 
and the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community in 1958, called 
for dismantling of all restrictions on the free movement of capital among EEC members.  
In addition to restricting international payments and capital flows, many countries 
also tightly regulated domestic capital markets during the war and for several years 
afterward.  In the United Kingdom, for example, all capital market issues were regulated by a 
Capital Issues Committee until 1959, when controls on domestic issues were relaxed (Dow 
1964, pp. 235-36).  Many other countries imposed similar restrictions on new capital issues 
in an effort to allocate the flow of national savings. 
The United States imposed comparatively few restrictions on either international 
payments or domestic capital markets.  Still, both were more heavily regulated in the post-
war period than they had been during the 1920s.  The 1929 stock market crash and 
subsequent allegations of fraud, insider trading, conflicts of interest, and other financial 
improprieties led to new regulations and government oversight of U.S. securities markets.  
Among the important laws enacted to regulate the issuance and trading of securities were the 
Securities Act of 1933, which required that investors receive material information about 
securities being offered for sale, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which established 
the Securities Exchange Commission as the principal federal agency responsible for 
oversight and enforcement of federal securities laws.  The latter act also authorized the 
Federal Reserve to set margin requirements on stock purchases.  Finally, the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933 prohibited the commingling of commercial and investment banking activities.
15  
                                                 
15  The Glass-Steagall Act is the portion of the Banking Act of 1933 that concerns the activities of commercial 
and investment banks.   19 
The financial regulatory regime that was established in the 1930s remained largely in place 
throughout the remainder of the 20
th Century. 
Two waves of stock market booms occurred among our ten sample countries during 
the 1950s, one centered around 1952-53, and the other around 1958-60.  Several countries, 
including France, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands had booms that began between 1950 and 
1952.  Post-war economic chaos gave way to recovery in Europe and Japan as international 
trade and payments agreements came into force, and U.S. aid – most notably the Marshall 
Plan – poured in.  By 1951, the per capita incomes of the United Kingdom, France and 
(West) Germany exceeded their pre-war levels by more than 10 percent (DeLong and 
Eichengreen, 1993).  DeLong and Eichengreen (1993) contend that the Marshall Plan was 
particularly important for European economic recovery.  Although the $13 billion in aid 
transferred from the United States to Western Europe was small relative to the size of 
European economies, aid was sufficient to give European countries breathing room to meet 
recovery needs without having to undertake contractionary policies to balance their 
international payments.  Further, DeLong and Eichengreen (1993) argue, the Marshall Plan 
promoted long-term growth by encouraging the establishment of mixed, market-oriented 
economies and enabling the unwinding of controls over product and factor markets.  Thus, 
while the Marshall Plan contributed to economic recovery in the short run, it also helped lay 
the foundation for long-term economic growth by promoting a market-orientation and 
favorable investment climate.  Although many restrictions on capital flows and investment 
remained, the combination of rapid economic growth and a foundation for future growth was 
an environment that proved conducive for booming stock markets. 20 
A second wave of European stock market booms began in 1957-58.  Economic 
growth enabled European countries to gradually relax exchange controls and trade barriers 
during the 1950s.  The signing of the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, which created the 
European Economic Community, and the reestablishment of currency convertibility by 
several countries in late 1958 were particularly noteworthy events.  The timing of stock 
market booms among European countries suggests that investors viewed these steps as likely 
to produce rapid growth of corporate profits and national income.
16
Figures 7 and 8 plot median real GDP growth and inflation (relative to their long-run 
averages) during stock market booms of the 1950s and 1960s among our ten sample 
countries.  Similar to the patterns observed for the interwar period, median output growth 
was above average and inflation below average during the booms of the 1950s and 1960s.  In 
market peak years, median real GDP growth exceeded its post-war average by approximately 
3 percentage points before falling back after booms ended.
17   
As shown in Figure 8, median inflation rose toward the end of booms of the 1950s 
and 1960s, as it had toward the end of interwar booms.  Interest rates also tended to rise 
toward the end of booms.  Although the Fisher effect can explain why nominal interest rates 
rise when inflation increases, real (ex post) interest rates also rose and money stock growth 
fell during the last two years of most booms, indicating that monetary conditions tightened.  
Monetary policy tightening might snuff out a stock market boom by raising the rate at which 
investors discount expected dividend growth and/or by reducing the path of expected 
                                                 
16  See Neal and Barbezat (1998, Chapters 2-3) for information about European economic recovery, integration 
and policies during 1945-58, and for analysis of the economic effects of the formation of the European 
Economic Community on its members. 
17 Here we define long-run average GDP growth as the annual average rate during 1960-2001, and long-run 
average inflation as the annual average rate during 1947-2001.  In Japan and many countries of Europe, real 
GDP growth was higher on average during the “Golden Age” of 1950-73, and especially during 1947-60 than in 
subsequent decades.  See Crafts and Toniolo (1996) and the papers therein for analysis of European economic 
growth after World War II. 21 
dividends.  The Federal Reserve responded aggressively to inflation, especially during the 
1950s, and both U.S. stock market booms of the 1950s and early 1960s ended as the Fed 
tightened in response to rising inflation.
18  The behavior of median interest rate levels and 
money stock growth rates across all booms of this era indicates that the ends of many booms 
coincided with monetary policy tightening. 
Stock Market Booms of the 1970s-90s 
We examine stock market booms of the 1970s-90s separately from those of the 
1950s-60s because the macroeconomic and regulatory environments of the two periods differ 
markedly, and because high frequency observations on a greater variety of macroeconomic 
series are available only for the period since 1970.  The 1970s witnessed the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, two major energy market shocks, high 
inflation, and a world-wide slowdown in productivity growth.  Only two of our ten countries 
experienced a stock market boom in the 1970s – Australia and Canada.  In both countries, 
rising commodity prices brought improved terms of trade and a rising stock market.  Energy 
and mining stocks have relatively heavy weight in the market indexes of both countries. 
The 1980s and 1990s, by contrast, saw declining energy prices and inflation, higher 
average output growth, and buoyant financial markets in many countries.  Several countries 
eliminated capital controls and deregulated financial markets and institutions in these years, 
and financial markets became more integrated across countries.  All ten countries 
experienced a stock market boom during the 1980s, and all but Japan had a boom in the 
1990s.   
                                                 
18 Calomiris and Wheelock (1998) show that the Fed reacted to rising (falling) inflation by draining (adding) 
reserves from the banking system, and Romer and Romer (2002) find that during the 1950s the Fed’s actions 
satisfied the so-called Taylor Principle in that policy resulted in changes in the real interest rate that exceeded 
changes in the rate of inflation.   22 
Advances in information-processing technologies that facilitated global financial 
transactions and innovations encouraged financial deregulation.  Countries adopted reforms 
to increase the efficiency of their domestic financial markets, tap foreign capital, and respond 
to various financial innovations, such as electronic trading and trading in stock market 
futures and options.   
The world’s first electronic stock exchange, the Nasdaq market, was created in the 
United States in 1971.  The United States deregulated brokerage commissions in the mid-
1970s.  Other countries followed suit in the 1980s and 1990s, abolishing minimum brokerage 
commissions and controls on the ownership of brokers and dealers, and establishing 
electronic trading and derivative securities markets.
19
The United Kingdom removed exchange controls in 1979; Japan and Germany 
followed suit in 1980 and 1984 (Yamada, 1991).  Other European countries eliminated 
controls on capital in the late 1980s and early 1990s under the terms of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union.   
In several countries, the removal of capital controls and deregulation of financial 
markets occurred as part of a sea change in economic policy.  Tax cuts, especially on capital 
income, widespread deregulation of industry, and monetary policies that brought inflation 
under control produced a more favorable business climate in many countries than had 
prevailed in the 1970s.  In the United States, these policies were augmented by less 
aggressive anti-trust enforcement, which encouraged mergers and acquisitions and a 
booming stock market (Wigmore, 1997). 
                                                 
19   For example, Japan permitted foreign firms to become members of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1982, and 
introduced domestic stock index futures trading in 1988 (Kato, 1991).  The United Kingdom abolished 
minimum brokerage commissions, permitted ownership of exchange member firms by outside corporations, and 
instituted electronic trading in 1986.  France abolished fixed brokerage commissions and broke-up the 
brokerage and market-making cartels, and introduced futures and options trading on the Paris exchange in 1987.   23 
Next, we identify the macroeconomic conditions under which stock market booms 
occurred during the 1970s-90s.  Figure 9 plots quarterly observations on median real GDP 
growth (relative to its long-run average) during boom episodes.
20  In contrast to earlier 
periods, when output growth typically exceeded its long-run average during booms, median 
output growth hovered near its long-run average across the stock market booms of the 1970s-
90s.  The median belies considerable variation in output growth rates across stock market 
booms, however.  Several countries had a stock market boom in the mid-to-late 1990s.  
During these booms, output growth exceeded its long-run average in Australia, Canada, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, but was near or below average in 
France, Germany, and Italy.   
Figure 9 plots U.S. real GDP growth (relative to its long-run average) during the 20 
quarters before and after the third quarter of 2000, when the U.S. boom of April 1994-August 
2000 ended.  Over the 18 quarters before the market peak in 2000:Q3, U.S. real GDP growth 
exceeded its long-run average by about 1 percentage point.  This boom was frequently 
attributed to an increase in productivity growth associated with advances in information 
technology.  Although internet and other information-processing technology stocks 
experienced the largest price gains, the U.S. stock market boom of 1994-2000 was broadly 
based as optimists expressed confidence in the prospects of accelerated earnings growth in 
the “new economy.”  Figure 10 shows that U.S. labor productivity growth exceeded its long-
run average by at least 1 percentage point in three of four years between 1996 and 1999.  The 
figure also shows, however, that across all booms of the 1970s-90s median productivity 
                                                 
20  Here we again define the long-run average as the average annual real GDP growth rate for 1960-2001. 24 
growth was near its long-run average.
21  Thus, by occurring when productivity growth was 
above average, the U.S. boom of 1994-2000 was unusual among booms of the 1980s-90s. 
Figure 11 plots monthly observations on U.S. inflation (relative to its long-run 
average) during the boom of 1994-2000 alongside median inflation across all booms of the 
1970s-90s.
22  As in earlier periods, inflation was typically below average during stock market 
booms of the 1970s-90s, and rising as booms ended.  The pattern held true during the U.S. 
boom of 1994-2000.  The increase in the rate of inflation before the August 2000 stock 
market peak occurred somewhat earlier, however, than the increase in median inflation 
across all booms.  
As with earlier stock market booms, most booms of the 1970s-90s were preceded by 
several months of monetary policy tightening.  For example, the U.S. stock market boom of 
1994-2000 ended after just over a year of Federal Reserve tightening.  Citing “a significant 
risk of rising inflation,” the Federal Reserve began to tighten in June 1999, and then 
increased its federal funds rate target by a total of 175 basis points to 6.5 percent over the 
next 12 months.
23  As a result, the real funds rate, measured as the current month’s funds rate 
minus the trailing year-over-year inflation rate, increased by about 40 basis points, while 
spreads between short- and long-term Treasury security yields narrowed until the yield curve 
inverted in early 2000.  The behavior of both nominal and real interest rates during other 
booms of the 1970s-90s show a similar pattern, with median nominal and real rates 
increasing about 1 percentage point, and about 0.6 percentage points, respectively, within the 
                                                 
21  We define the long-run average as the average annual labor productivity growth rate for 1970-2004. 
22  Here we again define the long-run average as the average year-over-year rate of inflation for 1947-2004. 
23  The target had been reduced from 5 percent to 4.75 percent on November 17, 1998.  The target was raised to 
5 percent on June 30, 1999, and elevated in five more steps to 6.5 percent on May 16, 2000.  The quotation in 
the text is from the transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee meeting of June 29-30, 1999. 25 
last eight months of booms.  Thus, we again find that booms typically ended following a 
period of monetary policy tightening associated with rising inflation. 
V.  Observations and Conclusions 
Our study of 20
th Century stock market booms among ten developed countries finds 
that markets reflect both underlying macroeconomic conditions and specific economic policy 
actions.  We find that stock market booms were an element of the business cycle, with booms 
typically arising during cyclical recoveries and other periods of rapid economic growth and 
ending when GDP growth slowed.  Many stock market booms were followed by large 
declines in real stock prices, if not outright market crashes, and a slowing of economic 
activity.  We also find an association between stock market booms and monetary policy.  
Booms typically arose when inflation was low and declining, and ended within a few months 
of an increase in the rate of inflation.  Rising inflation tended to bring tighter monetary 
conditions, reflected in higher real interest rates, declining term spreads, and reduced money 
stock growth. 
During the interwar period, the timing and extent of stock market booms in several 
countries bore a close relationship to exchange rate policies.  France, for example, 
experienced a stock market boom in 1926-29, after its exchange rate was pegged at a level 
that encouraged capital inflows and fiscal and monetary policies were adopted that brought 
inflation under control.  The United Kingdom, by contrast, pursued an overvalued exchange 
rate during the 1920s that resulted in capital outflows, slow economic growth and only 
modest real stock price appreciation.  Similarly, in many countries, the timing of economic 
recovery and stock market booms during the 1930s were closely associated with devaluation 
or outright abandonment of the gold standard. 26 
Stock market booms of the 1950s and 1960s reflected economic recovery and rapid 
growth after World War II.  In Europe, actions to reopen markets to trade and capital flows 
also buoyed financial markets and contributed to two waves of stock market booms.  We note 
in particular an apparent association between stock market booms in several European 
countries and the dismantling of trade barriers and exchange controls in the late 1950s.  
Finally, stock market booms of the 1970s-90s were somewhat less commonly associated with 
rapid economic growth, though the U.S. boom of 1994-2000 did occur during a period of 
rapid output and productivity growth, as well as low inflation.  We speculate that financial 
deregulation and globalization weakened the links between domestic economic growth and 
stock markets in the 1980s-90s.   
Stock market booms tended to be roughly in sync across countries throughout the 20
th 
Century.  Several countries had booms in the 1920s, mid-1930s, 1950s, mid-1980s, and late 
1990s, whereas few countries had booms between 1965 and 1980.  Stock market returns were 
more highly correlated across countries during boom periods than at other times.  The 
average correlation was especially high during the late 1920s and 1980s-90s, when financial 
markets and capital flows were comparatively unregulated.  In these decades, international 
financial markets were relatively highly integrated.  Average correlation was relatively low, 
and booms were less in sync, during the 1950s and 1960s when many of the financial 
regulations and capital controls imposed during the Great Depression and strengthened 
during World War II remained in force and interfered with international market integration.   
By studying the behavior of financial markets under a variety macroeconomic and 
policy environments, financial historians can provide much needed insights that help in 
devising policies that promote the efficient and stable operation of financial markets.  The 27 
history of 20
th Century stock market booms illustrates a close connections between domestic 
and international macroeconomic policies, financial regulation, and the performance of stock 
markets.  Our review finds that stock market booms have been closely related to monetary 
policies, as reflected both by the level of inflation and actions to control inflation.  Further, 
we find that international economic policies, such as capital controls and exchange rate pegs, 
and financial regulation affect the linkages between domestic economic performance and 
stock markets.  A key lesson for policy, therefore, is that the effects of macroeconomic 
policies on asset markets are likely to be influenced by both the domestic regulation and the 
international integration of those markets.  Thus, the efficient operation of financial markets 
would seem to hinge on both macroeconomic and regulatory policies, and how well those 
policies interact with one another. 28 
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This appendix provides information about the data and sources used in this paper.  We 
describe our stock price index data first, and then present information about the data used in 
each figure in the paper. 
 
Stock price index (nominal, monthly data):  For all countries except the United States, our 
stock price data are from Global Financial Data (www.globalfinancialdata.com).  The 
following lists the Global Financial Data series identifier and description for each country: 
 
Australia:  AORDM, Australia ASX All-Ordinaries 
Canada:  GSPTSEM, Canada S&P/TSX 300 Composite  
France:  SBF250M, France SBF-250 Index 
Germany:  FWBXXM, Germany CDAX Composite Index 
Italy:  BCIIM, Banca Commerciale Italiana Index 
Japan:  N225M, Japan Nikkei 225 Stock Average 
Netherlands: AAXM,  Netherlands  All-Share Price Index  
Sweden:  SWAVM, Sweden Affarsvarlden General Index 
U.K.:  FTASM, UK FT-Actuaries All-Share Index  
U.S.:  NBER Macro History Database, series m11025a (1871:01-1920:12); 
  Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Index (1941-1943=10), Monthly Average 
of daily data obtained from Haver Analytics (1921:01-2004:12) 
 
Real Stock price (monthly):  We use consumer price index data to deflate nominal stock 
prices to obtain a real stock price.  For all countries except the United States, our consumer 
price index data are from Global Financial Data.  The following lists the Global Financial 
Data consumer price index series identifier for each country.  Monthly observations are 
available beginning from the month listed in parentheses.   
 
Australia: CPAUSM  (1912:01) 
Canada: CPCANM  (1914:01) 
France: CPFRAM  (1915:01) 
Germany: CPDEUM  (1923:12) 
Italy: CPITAM  (1920:01) 
Japan: CPJPNM  (1922:01) 
Netherlands: CPNLDM  (1919:01) 
Sweden: CPSWEM  (1916:01) 
U.K.: CPGBRM  (1914:01) 
U.S.:  BLS,  Series ID: CUUR0000SA0, CPI - All Urban Consumers, U.S. City 
Average, All Items, not seasonally adjusted, 1982-84=100 (1913:01-2004:12) 
  
 
General Notes about the figures presented in the paper: 
•  We compute all growth rates using log first differencing, unless otherwise noted. 
•  For all figures displaying annual data, if the peak month of a boom occurred in the 
first six months of a year, we attribute the peak to the prior calendar year.  Otherwise, 32 
we attribute the peak to the calendar year that it occurred.  For figures displaying 
monthly or quarterly data, we attribute the peak to the actual month or quarter that it 
occurred. 
 
Figures 3, 5, and 7: 
 
Real GDP:  Data are from Maddison (2003), Tables 1b, 2b and 5b for 1871-2001 and the 
O.E.C.D. for 2001-04.  For booms ending prior to 1940, we define the long-run 
average growth rate as the average growth rate for 1871-1939.  For booms ending 
after 1940, we define the long-run average growth rate as the average growth rate for 
1960-2001. 
 
Figures 4, 6, and 8: 
 
Inflation:  The sources for consumer price index data are listed above.  We compute annual 
inflation rates by averaging annualized monthly growth rates.  For booms ending 
prior to 1940, we define the long-run average growth rate as the average growth rate 
from the first available observation through 1939 (first available observations: 
Australia, 1902; Canada, 1911; France, 1872; Germany, 1924; Italy, 1871; Japan, 
1871; Netherlands, 1882; Sweden, 1871; U.K., 1871; U.S., 1870).  For booms ending 





Real GDP:  Quarterly data downloaded from the OECDNEQ database of Haver Analytics.  
Data are available beginning in the quarter listed in parentheses: Australia (1960:1); 
Canada (1961:1); France (1978:1); Germany (1991:1); Italy (1980:1); Japan (1980:1); 
Netherlands (1977:1); Sweden (1980:1); U.K. (1960:1); U.S. (1960:1).  We compute 
growth rates as year-over-year growth rates for each quarter.  We define the long-run 
average growth rate as the average growth rate for 1960-2001, calculated using the 




Labor Productivity:  Annual data on GDP per hour worked obtained from the O.E.C.D. 
productivity database (July 2005).  The data for all countries span the years 1970-
2004.  We define the long-run average growth rate as the average growth rate for 




Inflation:  Monthly consumer price index data from Global Financial Data, listed above.  We 
compute the inflation rate as year-over-year growth in the consumer price index.  We 















































Australia Dec. 1920 Feb. 1929 10.7 July 1921 91 9.1 3.6 -20.1 -41.0 comparison: Jan. 1915-Dec. 1940
Sept. 1930 Mar. 1937 17.8 Oct. 1934 30 13.7 3.6 -12.2 -31.6
July 1956 July 1960 15.8 Aug. 1957 35 15.9 2.4 -11.6 -20.2a comparison Jan. 1947-Dec. 2004
Oct. 1966 Dec. 1969 21.8 Oct. 1967 26 17.5 2.4 -24.8 -42.2
Aug. 1977 Nov. 1980 21.9 Sept. 1979 14 32.1 2.4 -27.2 -47.2
July 1982 Sept. 1987 25.2 Mar. 1986 18 39.3 2.4 -35.8 -46.3a
Dec. 1990 Jan. 1994 18.9 Oct. 1993 3 36.9 2.4 -23.8 -23.8
Aug. 1998 June 2000 13.4 Jan. 1999 18 6.5 2.4 -0.8 -23.8
Canada
Dec. 1920 Sept. 1929 17.4 n/a n/a n/a 3.7 -37.5 -75.1 comparison: Feb. 1920-Dec. 1940
June 1932 Mar. 1937 28.0 n/a n/a n/a 3.7 -35.6 -35.6
Oct. 1953 July 1956 24.6 July 1954 25 23.5 3.4 -9.2 -32.4 comparison Jan. 1947-Dec. 2004
Oct. 1977 Nov. 1980 22.1 n/a n/a n/a 3.4 -25.2 -52.5
July 1984 July 1987 17.9 July 1985 24 15.3 3.4 -18.5 -26.7a
Jan. 1995 Apr. 1998 19.2 Nov. 1995 29 20.1 3.4 -10.0 -28.2a
Aug. 1998 Aug. 2000 34.7 Dec. 1999 8 42.0 3.4 -36.0 -43.6
France
Nov. 1920 July 1924 20.9 n/a n/a n/a 2.5 -16.1 -34.7 comparison Jan. 1920-Dec. 1939
Nov. 1926 Feb. 1929 40.4 Dec. 1927 14 37.9 2.5 -12.0 -57.0
Dec. 1950 Apr. 1955 28.4 n/a n/a n/a 2.8 -17.4 -11.1a comparison Jan. 1947-Dec. 2004
Aug. 1958 Apr. 1962 20 July 1960 21 14.3 2.8 -18.7 -54.1
June 1981 Apr. 1987 24.4 Jan. 1985 25 36.2 2.8 -32.8 -45.0
Feb. 1995 Aug. 2000 23.6 Jan. 1997 43 26.8 2.8 -29.5 -60.1
Germany
June 1957 Sept. 1960 43.6 Aug. 1958 25 54.1 6.0 -24.0 -49.3 comparison Jan. 1950-Dec. 2004
Aug. 1982 Apr. 1986 31.8 July 1983 33 28.8 6.0 -18.4 -44.7
Mar. 1995 Feb. 2000 23.9 Sept. 1996 41 27.8 6.0 -25.4 -69.9
Italy
May 1932 July 1935 27.5 n/a n/a n/a 0.4 -13.4 -20.0a comparison Feb. 1921-Dec. 1938
July 1950 Sept. 1955 18.5 Aug. 1952 37 22.7 3.1 -16.6 -22.2a comarison Jan. 1950-Dec. 2004
June 1958 Aug. 1960 56.4 Oct. 1958 23 58.7 3.1 -17.6 -17.6
Table 1
Stock Market BoomsDec. 1977 May 1981 35.0 n/a n/a n/a 3.1 -46.8 -54.1
Dec. 1982 Aug. 1986 38.2 Mar. 1986 5 34.3 3.1 -26.7 -47.9
Nov. 1995 Feb. 2000 33.6 July 1997 31 34.9 3.1 -18.8 -56.5
Japan
Oct. 1930 Feb. 1934 28.6 Feb. 1932 24 26.1 1.8 -12.0 -16.6 comparison Feb. 1923-Dec. 1940
Jan. 1950 Jan. 1953 54.3 Jan. 1952 12 93.1 6.9 -30.0 -36.4 comparison Jan. 1950-Dec. 2004
Dec. 1957 Jun 1961 36.3 Oct. 1958 32 38.7 6.9 -23.0 -52.7
Sept. 1982 Dec. 1989 23.9 Mar. 1983 81 22.5 6.9 -41.0 -47.6a
Netherlands
July 1924 Feb. 1929 10.9 Jan. 1926 36 6.1 -1.8 -15.7 -71.8 comparison March 1920-Dec. 1939
June 1932 Mar. 1937 26.6 n/a n/a n/a -1.8 -18.2 -31.5
Apr. 1952 June 1957 20.3 Nov. 1954 31 15.4 4.1 -19.8 -32.1a comparison Jan. 1947-Dec. 2004
Dec. 1957 Mar. 1961 22.2 May 1959 22 15.0 4.1 -10.5 -31.2
Sep. 1981 July 1987 22.0 Mar. 1983 52 20.1 4.1 -17.2 -36.7a
Jan. 1991 Aug. 2000 17.4 June 1993 74 19.6 4.1 -26.8 -65.4
Sweden
Mar. 1922 July 1929 16.9 n/a n/a n/a -1.8 -13.1 -73.3 comparison Feb. 1917-Dec. 1940
May 1932 Mar. 1937 23.2 n/a n/a n/a -1.8 -12.2 -12.2
Mar. 1958 Aug. 1961 15.1 Aug. 1958 36 13 5.7 -15.3 -20.2 comparison Jan. 1947-Dec. 2004
Sept. 1980 Mar. 1984 36.8 May 1981 34 34.7 5.7 -24.6 -29.3
Sept. 1992 Feb. 2000 31.4 Sept. 1995 53 30.6 5.7 -31.2 -67.2
United 
Kingdom
June 1932 Dec. 1936 15.4 Feb. 1936 10 5.4 -0.4 -23.6 -44.2 comparison Feb. 1916-Dec. 1939
June 1952 July 1955 20.0 July 1954 12 16.4 2.8 -17.3 -31.4 comparison Jan. 1947-Dec. 2004
Feb. 1958 Apr. 1961 25.4 Dec. 1958 28 19.6 2.8 -17.8 -31.0
Sept. 1981 July 1987 21.3 Oct. 1982 57 21.5 2.8 -23.4 -34.8a
June 1994 Dec. 1999 12.6 Apr. 1996 44 12.7 2.8 -10.6 -50.2
United States
Oct. 1923 Sept. 1929 23.7 Dec. 1924 57 24.4 2.4 -30.1 -80.6 comparison Jan. 1915-Dec. 1940
Mar. 1935 Feb. 1937 39.7 Oct. 1935 16 30.2 2.4 -39.0 -45.8
Sept. 1953 Apr. 1956 28.8 Mar. 1954 25 29.3 4.4 -9.6 -20.1 comparison Jan. 1947-Sept. 2004
June 1962 Jan. 1966 13.3 Dec. 1963 25 10.3 4.4 -12.5 -20.1a
July 1984 Aug. 1987 22.9 Feb. 1985 30 21.6 4.4 -22.3 -27.5a
Apr. 1994 Aug. 2000 17.1 Mar. 1995 64 18.7 4.4 -22.8 -46.8

















































































































1920 1923 1926 1929 1933 1936 1939 1942 1946 1949 1952 1955 1959 1962 1965 1968 1972 1975 1978 1981 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998Figure 3: Real GDP Growth (Minus Long-Run Average) - All 20th Century Booms








-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

















sFigure 4: Inflation (Minus Long-Run Average) - All 20th Century Booms
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sFigure 5: Real GDP Growth (Minus Long-Run Average) - Interwar Booms




















































sFigure 6: Inflation Rate (Minus Long-Run Average) - Interwar Booms






















































sFigure 7: Real GDP Growth (Minus Long-Run Average) - Booms of 1950s-60s






















































sFigure 8: Inflation Rate (Minus Long-Run Average) - Booms of 1950s-60s 






















































sFig 9: Real GDP Growth (Minus Long-Run Average) - Booms of 1970s-90s








































































U.S. Boom of 1990sFig 10: Labor Productivity Growth (Minus Long-Run Average) Booms of 1970s-90s
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U.S. Boom of 1990sFig 11:  Inflation (Minus Long-Run Average) - Booms of 1970s-90s



































































































U.S. Boom of 1990s